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Abstract
Human beings want to believe that good outcomes in the future are more likely,
but also want to make good decisions that increase average outcomes in the future.
We consider a general equilibrium model with complete markets and show that when
investors hold beliefs that optimally balance these two incentives, portfolio holdings
and asset prices match six observed patterns: (i) because the cost of biased beliefs are
typically second-order, investors typically hold biased assessments of probabilities and
so are not perfectly diversified according to objective metrics; (ii) because the costs of
biased beliefs temper these biases, the utility cost of the lack of diversification are lim-
ited; (iii) because there is a complementarity between believing a state more likely and
purchasing more of the asset that pays off in that state, investors over-invest in only
one Arrow-Debreu security and smooth their consumption well across the remaining
states; (iv) because different households can settle on different states to be optimistic
about, optimal portfolios of ex ante identical investors can be heterogeneous; (v) be-
cause low-price and low-probability states are the cheapest states to buy consumption
in, overoptimism about these states distorts consumption the least in the rest of the
states, so that investors tend to overinvest in the most skewed securities; (vi) finally, be-
cause investors with optimal expectations have higher demand for more skewed assets,
ceteris paribus, more skewed asset can have lower average returns.
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This paper studies portfolio holdings and asset prices in an economy in which people’s
natural tendency to be optimistic about the payout from their investments is tempered by
the ex post costs of basing their portfolio decisions on incorrect beliefs. We show that this
model can generate the following three stylized facts.
First, households’ portfolios are not optimally diversified according to various theoretical-
based measures (Marshall E. Blume et al. (1974), William N. Goetzmann and Alok Kumar
(2001) , Laurent E. Calvet et al. (2006), Stephanie Curcuru et al. (forthcoming)). The costs
of this lack of diversification appear to be modest. Most households hold a well-diversified
portfolio of mutual funds and also a significant amount of one or two additional stocks.1
Second, and part of the evidence for the first fact, household portfolios are tilted to-
wards stocks with identifiable attributes, and in particular towards holdings of individual
stocks with positive skewness. Further, undiversified households hold individual stocks that
have relatively high idiosyncratically skewed returns and their portfolios have relatively high
idiosyncratically skewed returns (Todd Mitton and Keith Vorkink (forthcoming)).
Finally, positively skewed assets tend to have lower returns. This is true for stocks in the
US stock market in general (Yijie Zhang (2005)) as well as for specific well-studied examples,
such as the value-growth premium and the long-run underperformance of IPOs.2
This paper argues that these three patterns are observed because human beings both
want to believe what makes them happier and want to make good decisions that lead to
good outcomes in the future. We consider an exchange economy with two periods and
complete markets in which households with log utility invest in the first period and consume
in the second period. We show that these patterns arise in this economy when investors
hold beliefs that optimally trade-off the ex ante benefits of anticipatory utility against the
1Further, and complementary evidence for our purposes, household income risk is not fully-insured by
households across groups of households, where moral-hazard would seem an implausible reason for this failure
(Orazio Attanasio and Steven J. Davis (1996)).
2There is also complementary evidence from gambling behavior. Lotteries are highly skewed assets, and
the demand for lottery tickets rises with probability controlling for expected return. And, in parimutuel
betting on races, in which the bettors determine returns in equilibrium, long-shots have lower expected
returns than favorites.
1
ex post costs of basing investment decisions on biased beliefs.
Our model of beliefs follows the optimal expectations framework of Markus K. Brun-
nermeier and Jonathan A. Parker (2005). We assume that people behave optimally given
their beliefs, choosing portfolios that maximize their expected present discounted value of
utility flows.3 Because investors care about expected future utility flows, they are happier
if they overestimate the probabilities of states of the world in which their investments pay
off well. But such optimism would lead to suboptimal decision making, and lower levels of
utility on average ex post. Optimal beliefs trade-off these competing forces: people’s beliefs
maximize the objective expectation of their well-being, the average of their expected present
discounted value of utility flows. This economic model of beliefs balances the anticipatory
benefits of optimism against the costs of basing actions on distorted beliefs. Because the
costs of small deviations from optimal behavior are of second order, and the anticipatory
benefits of biases in probabilities typically are of first-order, optimal subjective and objec-
tive probabilities differ. Christian Gollier (2005) and Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) study
portfolio choice and asset prices in incomplete markets (and a two-state complete market
example). This paper derives a general characterization in a complete markets economy.
In terms of portfolios, we show in Section I that an investor with optimal expectations
does not fully diversify its portfolio but instead biases upwards (a lot) its subjective beliefs
about the likelihood of one state and biases downward (a little) its subjective beliefs about the
likelihood of all the remaining states. It does this because there is a natural complementarity
between believing a state more likely and purchasing more of the asset that pays off in that
state. Once a state is perceived as more likely, one wants more consumption in that state, and
once one has more consumption in that state, one wants even more to believe that that state
is more likely. We further show that an investor chooses to be optimistic about the states
associated with the most skewed Arrow-Debreu securities: either the least expensive state
3Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) shows that differences in investor’s self-reported beliefs about future
market returns (or internet stock returns) are highly significantly correlated with the share of their portfolio
in equities (or in internet stocks).
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(when states are equally likely) or the least likely state (when state prices are actuarially fair)
or the least expensive and least likely state when these coincide (in general). This happens
because low-price and low-probability states are the cheapest states to buy consumption
in, and so distort consumption in the rest of the states the least (for a given bias). Thus
portfolios are not perfectly diversified, households overinvest in the most skewed assets, and
household portfolios have positively skewed returns.
In general equilibrium, we show in Section II that investors tend to be optimistic about
different states. Thus investors’ portfolios have idiosyncratically skewed returns and con-
sumption insurance appears to be incomplete. In terms of asset prices, this preference for
skewed returns has price effects. Ceteris paribus, states with relatively small probabilities
tend to have relatively low expected returns.4
All proofs are contained in the appendix.
I. Portfolio choice with optimal expectations
The economy has two periods. There are S possible states of the world in period 2, with
state s having objective probability pis > 0. An investor with subjective beliefs pˆis allocates
his wealth among a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities in the first period and consumes
the payoff from this portfolio in the second period. A person’s investment choices, c =
{c1, c2, .., cS}, maximize his expected utility given his subjective beliefs, pˆi = {pˆi1, pˆi2, .., pˆiS}:
V1 = max
c
∑S
s=1
pˆis ln (cs) subject to
∑S
s=1
pscs = 1 and cs ≥ 0, (1)
4Nicholas C. Barberis and Ming Huang (2005) show that exogenous belief distortion as proposed by
Prospect Theory can lead to similar investment and price patterns. Gollier (2005) shows that in an incomplete
markets investment problem with a stock and a bond, optimal expectations imply that the investor biases
up the probability of the states in which the risky asset’s returns are the highest and the lowest, as implied
by Prospect Theory. Thus, in this situation, overweighting extreme events is an endogenous outcome of the
trade-off between the benefits of anticipatory feelings and the suboptimality actual outcomes, rather than
being an exogenous characteristic of human beings.
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where ps > 0 is the price of the Arrow-Debreu security yielding one unit in state s, and
initial wealth is normalized to unity.5 Optimal portfolio choices exist and are unique:
c∗s (pˆi) =
pˆis
ps
. (2)
Optimal beliefs. But what are the investor’s subjective beliefs? One assumption is
that people hold rational expectations, an extreme assumption typically made both for its
tractability and for the discipline it provides. Further, the argument goes, since rational
beliefs lead to the best decisions and thus the highest average present discounted value of
utility, people have the incentive to acquire information and learn rationally so that their
beliefs should have a general tendency to converge to objective probabilities.
But in fact, rational beliefs do not lead to the highest expected present discounted value
of utility flows. An investor can increase V1 by holding quite irrational beliefs, trading
on these, and then anticipating high average future utility. But non-rational beliefs come
at a cost. A person that makes objectively poor investment decisions has lower utility ex
post, V2 = ln c, on average. Our theory balances these effects – it trades off the anticipatory
benefits of optimism against the utility losses caused by decisions based on optimistic beliefs.
Further, this approach provides discipline: biases in beliefs are determined endogenously by
the economic environment.
Formally, each investor’s beliefs maximize his well-being, defined as the average expected
utility across periods 1 and 2 when actions are optimal given subjective beliefs. That is,
pˆi maximizes 1
2
E [V1 + V2] subject to the constraints that the pˆis are probabilities and that
portfolio choices are optimal given pˆi. This wellbeing function is similar to that proposed in
Andrew J. Caplin and John Leahy (2000), and analogous arguments support our use of this
5While here we assume ps > 0, Section II endogenizes prices and derives this as a result.
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function. Optimal beliefs maximize the Lagrangian
L =∑Ss=1 pˆis ln c∗s (pˆi) +∑Ss=1 pis ln c∗s (pˆi)− µ
[
S∑
s=1
pˆis − 1
]
(3)
(and subject to pˆis ≥ 0). Beliefs impact well-being directly through anticipation of future
flow utility and indirectly through their effect on portfolio choice.6
Because c∗s (pˆi) is continuous in subjective probabilities, L is also; and since probability
spaces are compact, optimal beliefs exist. Further, if pˆis = 0, c
∗
s (pˆi) = 0 and the investor
would get infinite negative utility if state s is realized.
Proposition 1: (Existence of interior optimal beliefs)
Optimal subjective probabilities, pˆi∗, exist and are positive: 0 < pˆi∗s < 1 for all s.
Turning to the characterization of behavior, the first-order conditions for beliefs are
pis
pˆis
− ln pis
pˆis
= µ− 1 + ln ps
pis
for all s. (4)
And the second order conditions (reorganized) are
pˆis
[
1− pis′
pˆis′
]
≤ pˆis′
[
pis
pˆis
− 1
]
for all s 6= s′. (5)
The first-order conditions are displayed in Figure I.1, which plots the left-hand-side and
the right-hand-side of the equations against pis/pˆis. The left-hand-sides of the first-order
conditions are all identical convex curves with minima at rationality, pˆis = pis; the right-
hand-sides are horizontal lines, independent of beliefs, that are higher for states that are
more expensive per unit of probability. By Proposition 1, we know that µ is such that the
left-hand-side of each first-order condition intersects the right at least once (with 0 < pˆis < 1
6This approach is a ‘frictionless extreme’ in the sense that only ex-post costs limit biases in beliefs.
Additional factors might also constrain biases.
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Figure I.1: First-order conditions for optimal beliefs
for all s). Thus, each first-order condition has one or two solutions.7 If for state s, the
right-hand side equals one, then rational beliefs are the only possible solution. Otherwise,
the right-hand side is greater than one, and, by the concavity and linearity of the two sides,
there are two solutions to the first-order condition, one with a positive bias and one with
a negative bias. From the second-order condition if beliefs about the probability of s′ are
biased upwards, so that pis′/pˆis′ < 1, then pis/pˆis > 1 for all s 6= s′ so that beliefs about the
probabilities of all other states are biased downwards. Further analysis of the program shows
that rational beliefs are optimal beliefs only if S = 2 and pi1 = pi2 and p1 = p2.
Proposition 2: If S = 2 and pi1 = pi2 and p1 = p2, rational beliefs are optimal. Otherwise:
(i) one and only one state has upward-biased subjective probability, all other states have
downward-biased subjective probability: ∃ s′ such that pˆi∗s′ > pis′ and pˆi∗s < pis for all s 6= s′,
(ii) among states with downward-biased subjective probabilities, states with larger price-
probability ratios (economy-wide stochastic discount factors) are biased down by larger fac-
7Equations (4) are Lambert W functions in pis/pˆis and in general no closed-form solution exists.
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tors: for s′′, s′ ∈ {s : pˆi∗s < pis}, pis′/pˆi∗s′ > pis′′/pˆi∗s′′ iff ps′/pis′ > ps′′/pis′′ and pis′/pˆi∗s′ = pis′′/pˆi∗s′′
iff ps′/pis′ = ps′′/pis′′ .
The result that the investor biases upward the probability of only one state comes from
a natural complementarity between the subjective belief about a state and the level of con-
sumption in that state. Once a state is perceived as more likely, one wants more consumption
in that state, and once one has more consumption in that state, there are greater benefits to
believing that that state is more likely. The second part of the proposition is driven by the
same force. An investor purchases less consumption in a more expensive state, and so has a
greater incentive to believe that the more expensive state is unlikely to occur.
For the remainder of this section, we rule out the knife-edge case that delivers rationality.
Assumption 1: Either S > 2 or pis 6= 1/2 or p1 6= p2.
We now characterize which state an investor is optimistic about. The benefits of optimism
about a state are related to the consumption purchased in that state and the costs are related
to the objective misallocation of consumption across states. The costs are second-order, so
for an infinitesimal change in beliefs a person should bias upwards the probability of the
state in which they have the most consumption. Starting from rational beliefs, this is the
cheapest state in terms of price-probability ratio.
Analogously, optimal expectations, which are not infinitesimal deviations from rational-
ity, tend to bias upward the probability of the cheapest state because extra consumption in
that state requires the least decrease in consumption in the remaining states, where ‘cheap’
refers to a combination of low price and low ratio of price to probability. If all states have
the same ratio of price to probability, the investor biases upwards the probability of the
lowest price (and probability) state. If states have equal objective probabilities but vary in
price, then the investor overestimates the probability of the least-expensive state because
this requires the smallest reduction in consumption in the other states.8
8Other effects are present – the elasticity of consumption to beliefs, and the curvature of the utility
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Proposition 3: (i) If all states have the same price-probability ratio, ps/pis = m for all s,
the investor overestimates the probability of (one of) the state(s) with the lowest probability.
(ii) If all states are equally likely, pis = pi for all s, then the investor overestimates the
probability of (one of) the state(s) with the lowest price-probability ratio.
(iii) If one state has both the lowest probability and the lowest price-probability ratio,
then the investor overestimates the probability of this state.
(iv) For any state, there exist m¯ and m, such that for a sufficiently low price ps ≤ mpis
optimal beliefs overestimate the probability of this state, pˆi∗s > pis, and for a sufficiently high
price ps ≥ m¯pis optimal beliefs underestimate the probability of this state, pˆi∗s < pis.
The labels of ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’ in Figure I.1 denote the actual optimal beliefs
when states have equal probability: the state with the lowest price per unit of probability
is viewed with optimism and the remaining states are viewed with pessimism (Proposition
3(ii)). Figure I.2, discussed subsequently, displays the first-order conditions when states are
priced fairly.
Optimal portfolio choice. While beliefs are interesting, our ultimate interest is in
explaining prices and quantities, that is, returns and portfolios.
Consider first the case of actuarially fair prices, ps/pis = m for all s. Under rational
beliefs, the optimal portfolio is risk-free. For optimal beliefs, Equations (2) and (4) imply
first-order conditions 1/mcs+ lnmcs = µ− 1+ lnm for all s, where the Lagrange multiplier
µ is such that c¯pis′ + c
∑
s6=s′ pis = 1/m and (c, c¯) are the two solutions to this equation: c¯ is
the consumption level in the state with positively-biased subjective probability, and c is the
consumption level in the remaining states. This can be seen in Figure I.2, which displays
the first-order conditions when prices are actuarially fair. Because the right-hand-sides are
identical, all pessimistic biases are identical. The following corollaries follow directly.
Corollary 1: (Preference for skewness) If ps/pis = m for all s, then the investor prefers
function matter – but this is the strongest effect here.
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Figure I.2: First-order conditions when states are priced fairly
the most skewed assets: the investor buys c¯ of one of the Arrow-Debreu securities that pays
off with the smallest probability and c < c¯ of each of the remaining securities.
Corollary 2: (Two-fund separation) If ps/pis = m for all s, then the investor holds a
portfolio consisting of the risk-free asset (an equal amount of all Arrow-Debreu securities)
and an additional positive amount of one and only one of the most skewed securities.
These Corollaries match two of the empirical findings described at the start of the paper.
First, investors are well diversified except for investing in one asset. Second, both the return
on the additional asset they hold and the return on their portfolios are positively skewed.
When prices are not actuarially fair, investors still do not optimally diversify and in-
vest more than the rational investor in securities with skewed returns. The latter occurs
both because investors tend to be optimistic about states with low probabilities and prices
(Proposition 3) and because pessimism is more severe for states with high prices (Proposi-
tion 2(ii)).In general, diversification, preferred by a rational agent, would destroy skewness,
preferred by an agent with optimal expectations.
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As we now show, equilibrium prices tend to make different investors optimistic about
different states, and so portfolios in equilibrium tend to be heterogeneous and have idiosyn-
cratically skewed returns.
II. Asset pricing in an exchange economy with optimal expectations
We consider an exchange economy with a unit mass of investors, S > 2, and aggregate per
capita endowment in each state of Cs. Due to space constraints, we consider an example
that illustrates the general characteristics of optimal expectations equilibria. In this economy,
portfolios are heterogeneous across investors, portfolio returns are idiosyncratically skewed,
and securities with positively skewed returns have lower expected returns.
Definition: An optimal expectations equilibrium is a portfolio ci and beliefs pˆii for each
agent i and prices p such that: (i) each agent’s portfolio is optimal given his beliefs and
prices; (ii) each agent’s beliefs maximize his well-being; (iii) the market for each asset clears.
Before analyzing a more complex environment, consider first an economy with equally
probable states, pis = pi, and no aggregate risk, Cs = C = 1. Suppose that prices are
actuarially fair, ps = p. Each investor biases upward the subjective probability of one state,
purchases c¯ of the Arrow-Debreu security associated with this state, and purchases c < c¯ of
the Arrow-Debreu security associated with the remaining downwards-biased states (where
c¯ and c are as defined in the previous section). This is an equilibrium if an equal share
of agents are optimistic about each state, so that demand for consumption is equal across
states, and each asset’s price is p = 1/S. This equilibrium is locally stable, in the sense that
a small change in prices would lead all investors to bias up the subjective probabilities of
the cheapest states (Proposition 3(ii)), which would lead to excess demand for consumption
in these states and a (relative) increase in price for the cheapest states.
Consider now similar economies in which the variation in the aggregate endowment across
states is ‘not too large.’ An equilibrium with actuarially fair prices exists as long as there exist
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different shares of agents that are optimistic about each state so that the demand for each
asset matches the supply. Thus, in economies with equally probable states and low aggregate
risk, prices are fair and agents hold heterogeneous beliefs, overinvest in different skewed
assets, and thus hold portfolios with idiosyncratically skewed returns. In the corresponding
rational expectations equilibrium, investors’ portfolios would be homogeneous and perfectly
diversified, cs = Cs. Further, also unlike in the rational expectations equilibrium, aggregate
risk, in limited amounts, is not priced.9 People have an interest in risk, and a small amount of
aggregate risk satisfies this desire without changing prices. Finally, as aggregate endowment
risk increases beliefs become less heterogeneous.
Proposition 4: (Heterogenous portfolios and idiosyncratic skewness) For pis = pi,
there exists a set of aggregate endowment vectors, including (C,C, ..., C), such that prices
are actuarially fair and a fraction λs′ of investors buys c¯ of the Arrow-Debreu security that
pays off in state s′ and c of the security for every other state. C =(C1, ..., CS) is in this set
if there exists shares of agents, λs, such that
∑S
s=1 λs = 1 and Cs′ = λs′ c¯+
(
1−∑s6=s′ λs) c
for all s′ where c and c¯ are defined in Section I with ps = p = 1/ ((S − 1) c+ c¯).
Having established this result, we now construct our example that matches all three styl-
ized facts discussed in the introduction. Consider an economy with some unlikely states and
some likely states. At actuarially fair prices, each investor would bias upward his probability
of one of the unlikely states. Analogously to Proposition 4, this is an equilibrium if there
exists shares of investors that are optimistic about each unlikely state such that the market
clears. For example, if pis = pi
A and Cs = C
A := 1
s
c¯+
(
1− 1
s
)
c for s ≤ s and pis = piB > piA
and Cs = C
B := c for s > s, then an equilibrium with fair prices exists in which 1/s investors
bias up their probabilities for states s ≤ s. But if the endowments across states are not so
different, then prices in the unlikely states must be relatively higher so that demand for
9The equality of probabilities across states is key for this results. With unequal probabilities, aggregate
risk is typically priced.
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output is also relatively lower in these states, and hence the expected returns of the most
skewed Arrow-Debreu securities are lower.
Proposition 5: (Underperformance of skewed assets) For a small reduction in
CA − CB such that ps does not change for s > s, ps increases for s ≤ s so that: (i)
the securities with the more skewed returns have lower expected returns than in a rational
expectations equilibrium; and (ii) the securities with the more skewed returns have relatively
lower expected returns, piA/ps < pi
B/ps′ for all s ≤ s and s′ > s.
This equilibrium fits all three stylized facts: (a) portfolios are heterogeneous and not
perfectly diversified; (b) each investor overinvests in one security that is more skewed than
the average security and his portfolio return is more skewed than the market return; (c) more
positively skewed securities have lower returns. These results relate to the use of co-skewness
as a pricing factor. As CA varies (and in richer environments), the relative importance of
idiosyncratic skewness and aggregate skewness for asset prices varies. Finally, consumption
insurance appears incomplete, but not because of missing markets or moral hazard, but
rather because households optimally choose to hold risk.
How important are the assumptions of our example? First, if the low-probability states
have much larger endowments than the other states (Cs > C
A), then we still match (a) and
(b), but the expected returns on the most skewed assets are higher for the usual reason that
investors discount payouts in states with high aggregate endowment. However, even in this
case, Proposition 5(i) implies that the returns on the most skewed assets are lower than in a
rational expectations equilibrium. Second, the assumption that some probabilities are equal
is not essential. If probabilities differ among high-probability states, nothing changes. If
probabilities differ among low-probability states, prices would have to be higher for lower
probability states for investors to remain indifferent among (perhaps a subset) of states and
for portfolios to be heterogeneous.
The desire for skewness can also impact the market return. If bad aggregate states have
12
low probabilities, as for disasters or Peso problems, then it is possible for the desire for
skewness to increase the equity premium, as investors seek to avoid negative skewness.
In conclusion, the natural human tendency towards optimism tempered by the real costs
of poor decisions, implies that people hold heterogeneous, underdiversified portfolios to attain
skewed returns, and that this behavior reduces the returns of positively skewed assets.
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Appendix: Proofs
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Define the set Π =
{
pˆi : 0 ≤ pˆis ≤ 1,
∑S
s=1 pˆis = 1
}
. Optimal consumption choices given be-
liefs are continuous in probabilities on Π (Equation (2)). The objective for beliefs (Equation
(3)) is thus continuous in beliefs on Π since L is linear in pˆi and continuous in c. Since Π
is compact, a maximum exists on Π. To see that the optimum requires 0 < pˆis < 1 for all
s, note that for pˆi such that pˆis = 0 for at least one s, c
∗
s = 0, and thus the objective for
beliefs has value negative infinity and this cannot be optimal since the objective is finite on
the interior of Π.¥
B. Proof of Proposition 2
To establish the results, we first prove four lemmas. Without loss of generality, we choose
units so that
S∑
s=1
ps = 1.
This implies that ps/pis = m = 1 for all s for actuarially fair prices.
Lemma 1: The subjective belief of at most one state is biased upwards.
Proof of Lemma 1 : The second-order condition, Equation (5), implies
pˆi2s [pˆis′ − pis′ ] ≤ pˆi2s′ [pis − pˆis] for all s 6= s′. (B.1)
Thus if beliefs about the likelihood of s′ are biased upwards, so that pˆis′ − pis′ > 0, then
pˆis − pis < 0 for all s 6= s′.¥
The proof of Lemma 1 also directly implies Lemma 2.
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Lemma 2: If the subjective belief of one state is biased upwards, then the subjective
beliefs of all other states are biased downwards.
Lemma 2 corresponds to result (i) in Proposition 2, except that we still need to prove that
rational expectation cannot be optimal except in the case in which prices are actuarially fair,
probabilities are equal, and there are only two states. We first examine the case of actuarially
unfair prices.
Lemma 3: If prices are not actuarially fair, rational beliefs cannot be optimal.
Proof of Lemma 3 : The first-order conditions (4) for rational beliefs are
1 = µ− 1 + ln ps
pis
for all s
which cannot be satisfied for all s if ps/pis 6= ps′/pis′ for some s and s′.¥
Combining lemmata 2 and 3 implies that there is one, and only one, state whose proba-
bility is biased upwards when prices are actuarially unfair. In the remaining proof of result
(i), we assume that prices are actuarially fair.
Lemma 4: If prices are actuarially fair, ps/pis = 1 for all s, then the investor biases his
beliefs for all states with downward-biased subjective probabilities by a common factor: For
one state, s′, cs′ = c¯ ≥ 1 and pˆis′ = c¯pis′ ≥ pis′ , and for all other states, s 6= s′, cs = c ≤ 1 and
pˆis = cpis ≤ pis, where (c, c¯) are the two solutions to
1
c
− ln 1
c
= µ− 1 (B.2)
with µ such that c¯pis′ + c
∑
s6=s′ pis = 1.
Proof of Lemma 4 : Equation (B.2) is the first-order conditions for optimal beliefs written
in terms of consumption using Equation (2). If µ = 2, cs = 1 for all states, in which case
beliefs are rational and the Lemma holds trivially (c = c¯). If µ > 2, every first-order condition
has the same two possible solution, so that cs = pˆis/ps = pˆis/pis is the same among all states
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whose likelihood is biased down. For these states let c := c∗s (pˆi). Then Lemma 1 implies
that there is at most one state perceived as more likely than it is, and let its consumption
level be c¯. We note µ < 2 is not possible by Proposition 1.¥
We now prove that the one specific case has rational expectations and part (i) for actu-
arially fair prices by using these Lemmas to analyze the program given by Equation (3).
Let pi denote the probability of the state whose probability is biased upwards, and let
c be the consumption level in that state, which is denoted s′. By Lemma 3, we know that
the consumption level is a constant c in all other states. Using the fact that pi = cpi, we can
rewrite the Lagrangian objective for beliefs as a function of only c¯ and pi:
L = ∑Ss=1 cspis ln cs +∑Ss=1 pis ln cs − µ
[
S∑
s=1
cspis − 1
]
= pic¯ ln c¯+ (1− pi) c ln c+ pi ln c¯+ (1− pi) ln c− µ [c¯pi + (1− pi) c− 1]
= pi (c¯+ 1) ln c¯+ (2− pi (c¯+ 1)) ln
(
1− pic¯
1− pi
)
:= U (c¯, pi)
where the last step imposes the constraint by substituting in c = 1−pic¯
1−pi . U (c¯, pi) is maximized
over the choice of state to bias upward and consumption level in that state. We proceed in
two steps.
Suppose that we know the state, and thus its objective probability pi, whose belief is
biased upwards. We determine the optimal bias c in the following way. Notice first that
U(1, pi) = 0 and that
∂U
∂c¯
(c¯, pi) = pi ln
c¯(1− pi)
1− pic¯ + pi
1− c¯
c¯(1− pic¯) .
Evaluating Uc¯ at c¯ = 1 and c¯ = (1− pi)/pi, we obtain that
∂U
∂c¯
(1, pi) = 0,
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and
∂U
∂c¯
(
1− pi
pi
, pi) = 2pi ln
1− pi
pi
+
2pi − 1
1− pi .
The second derivative of U with respect to c¯ is:
∂2U
∂c¯2
(c¯, pi) = −2pi2 (c¯− 1)(c¯−
1
2pi
)
c¯2(1− pic¯)2 . (B.3)
When pi = 1/2, the right-hand side of the above equality is negative, implying that U is
concave in c¯. Combining this with Uc¯(1, 1/2) = 0 directly implies that c¯ = 1 (and so pi = pi) is
optimal if pi = 1/2. This sheds light on the special case with only two states that are equally
likely. In that case, the choice of the state whose probability would be biased upwards is
arbitrary, and we have just shown that it is optimal not to distort beliefs. We now argue
that in all other cases, pˆi 6= pi.
First, we show that if we consider pi < 1/2, then c¯ > 1/2pi so that pˆi > 1/2 > pi. When pi is
less than 1/2, we see from (B.3) that U is alternatively concave, convex and concave (in c¯) over
the intervals ]0, 1], [1, 1/2pi] and [1/2pi, 1/pi]. Combining this with U(1, 1/2) = Uc¯(1, 1/2) = 0
implies that the optimal solution has a c¯ larger than 1/2pi.
Second, we show that given pi, the optimal c¯ has c¯ ≤ (1 − pi)/pi, or equivalently that
pi ≤ 1− pi. This follows from
q(pi) =
∂U
∂c¯
(
1− pi
pi
, pi) = 2pi ln
1− pi
pi
+
2pi − 1
1− pi
being negative when pi is less than 1/2.10 This implies that c¯ ≤ (1− pi) /pi or pˆi ≤ 1−pi which
10This is because q(1/2) = 0, and
q′(pi) = 2 ln
1− pi
pi
+
2pi − 1
(1− pi)2 ,
q′′(pi) =
2(2pi − 1)
pi(1− pi)3 ,
so that q′(1/2) = 0 and q′′ has the same sign than pi−0.5. This implies that q has the same sign than pi−0.5.
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implies that the state perceived as more likely than it is necessarily has pi ≤ 1/2. Combined
with the first result, we know that if the optimal pi 6= 1/2, we have pˆis 6= pis for all s (“for all
s” follows from Lemma 2).
What we still need to show is that pi 6= 1/2 when there are more than 2 states with one
state having probability 1/2. We do this by showing that the function V (pi) = maxc¯ U(c¯, pi)
is symmetric and U-shaped with a minimum at 1/2. Thus, as long as there exists a state with
probability different from 1/2, pˆi 6= pi. V is symmetric around pi = 1/2 from the definition
of V . By the envelop theorem, we have that
V ′(pi) =
pi
(
c¯− 1−pi
pi
)
(1− c¯)2
c¯(1− pi)(1− pic¯) ,
where c¯ maximizes U (c¯, pi). Suppose that pi is less than 1/2. We have seen above that it
implies that c¯ is larger than 1/2 but smaller (1 − pi)/pi, yielding V ′(pi) < 0. This shows
that the optimal state to bias upwards is the objectively least likely one. Except the case
pi1 = pi2 = 1/2, this state has a pi less than 1/2, which implies that c < 1 < c. This concludes
the proof of result (i) in Proposition 2.
The above proof also directly implies Lemma 5, used in the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 5: If prices are actuarially fair, ps/pis = 1 for all s, then pˆis′ ≥ 1/2 where s′ is the
state whose probability is biased upwards.
Proposition 2(ii) follows directly from the first-order conditions, Equation (4). Given
that one selects the solution with pis/pˆis > 1, the left-hand side is increasing in pis/pˆis and
the right-hand side is increasing in price-probability ratio, ps/pis.¥
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 2 implies the pattern of belief distortion but does not specify which is the state
that has its probability biased upwards.
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The proof of part (i) relies on the function V (pi) defined in the proof of Proposition 2(i)
as the value of holding beliefs that are optimistic about state s′ where pi is the probability
associated with this state. The proof of Proposition 2(i) shows that this function, V (pi), is
symmetric and U-shaped with a minimum at 1/2. Further, the proof of Proposition 2(i)
shows that the optimal s′ is necessarily such that pi ≤ 1/2. Thus, V (pi) is maximized by
choosing to bias upwards the probability of (one of) the smallest probability state(s).
To prove part (ii), we show that the local maximum in which subjective probabilities
satisfy the first-order conditions and the budget constraint with an arbitrary optimistic state
is dominated by the same set of subjective probabilities in which the subjective probability
of this state and the cheapest state are interchanged.
Let states 1to s¯ be the least expensive states, ps = ps′ < ps′′ for s
′, s ≤ s¯ and s′′ > s¯. Let
pˆi∗ (s′′) denote the vector of subjective probabilities that satisfy the first-order conditions,
sum to one, and have pˆis′′ > pis′′ and pˆis < pis for all s 6= s′′ and let L (pˆi∗ (s′′) ,p) denote the
associated value of the objective for beliefs:
L (pˆi∗ (s′′) ,p) :=∑Ss=1 pˆi∗s (s′′) ln( pˆi∗s (s′′)ps
)
+
∑S
s=1 pis ln
(
pˆi∗s (s
′′)
ps
)
where p denotes the vector of prices.
Consider taking pˆi∗ (s′′) for some s′′ > s¯ and switching the subjective probability for state
s′′ (pˆi∗s′ (s
′′)) with the subjective probability some state s′ ≤ s¯ (pˆi∗s′ (s′′)),
(pˆi∗1 (s
′′) , ..., pˆi∗s′′ (s
′′) , ..., pˆi∗s¯ (s
′′) , ..., pˆi∗s′ (s
′′) , ..pˆi∗S (s
′′)) := pˆiSwitch (s′′)
This is feasible because it is still the case that probabilities sum to one and as a result the
budget constraint is also satisfied. For notational simplicity, for the moment, let pˆi∗s = pˆi
∗
s (s
′′).
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Since well-being differs only in states s′ and s′′,
L (pˆiSwitch (s′′) ,p)− L (pˆi∗ (s′′) ,p) = (pˆi∗s′′ + pi) ln pˆi∗s′′ps′ − (pˆi∗s′ + pi) ln pˆi
∗
s′
ps′
+(pˆi∗s′ + pi) ln
pˆi∗s′
ps′′
− (pˆi∗s′′ + pi) ln
pˆi∗s′′
ps′′
= (pˆi∗s′′ − pˆi∗s′) ln
ps′′
ps′
> 0
where the sign follows from the initial assumptions that ps′ < ps′′ and that optimism is
focussed on state s′ so that pˆi∗s′′ (s
′′) > pi > pˆi∗s′ (s
′′).
Since pˆiSwitch (s′′) is not optimally chosen for the situation in which the investor biases
upward his beliefs about state s′, these probabilities may not satisfy the first-order conditions
and so are weakly worse than those that are optimally chosen conditional on being optimistic
about state s′:
L (pˆi∗ (s′) ,p) ≥ L (pˆiSwitch (s′′) ,p)
Thus we have,
L (pˆi∗ (s′) ,p) ≥ L (pˆiSwitch (s′′) ,p) > L (pˆi∗ (s′′) ,p) for all s′′ > s¯ and s′ ≤ s¯
which completes the proof of part (ii).
For part (iii), we make a similar argument. Let states 1to s¯ be the least expensive and
lowest probability states, ps = ps′ < ps′′ and pis = pis′ < pis′′ for s
′, s ≤ s¯ and s′′ > s¯. Consider
taking pˆi∗ (s′′) for some s′′ > s¯ and switching the subjective probability for state s′′ (pˆi∗s′ (s
′′))
with the subjective probability some state s′ ≤ s¯ (pˆi∗s′ (s′′)) and let this vector be denoted
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pˆiSwitch (s′′). Since well-being differs only in states s′ and s′′,
L (pˆiSwitch (s′′) ,p)− L (pˆi∗ (s′′) ,p) = (pˆi∗s′′ + pis′′) ln pˆi∗s′′ps′ − (pˆi∗s′ + pis′) ln pˆi
∗
s′
ps′
+(pˆi∗s′ + pis′) ln
pˆi∗s′
ps′′
− (pˆi∗s′′ + pis′′) ln
pˆi∗s′′
ps′′
= (pˆi∗s′′ − pˆi∗s′) ln
ps′′
ps′
+ (pis′′ − pis′) ln ps′′
ps′
where the sign follows from the initial assumptions that pis′′ > pis′ , ps′ < ps′′ and that
optimism is focussed on state s′ so that pˆi∗s′′ (s
′′) > pi > pˆi∗s′ (s
′′).
Analogously to part (ii), since pˆiSwitch (s′′) is not optimally chosen for the situation in
which the investor biases upward his beliefs about state s′:
L (pˆi∗ (s′) ,p) ≥ L (pˆiSwitch (s′′) ,p)
Thus we have,
L (pˆi∗ (s′) ,p) ≥ L (pˆiSwitch (s′′) ,p) > L (pˆi∗ (s′′) ,p) for all s′′ > s¯ and s′ ≤ s¯
which completes the proof of part (iii).
For part (iv) of Proposition 3, we first note that, for any problem, there is a lower bound
placed on µ by the requirement of real solutions to the first-order conditions (Proposition
1). Thus,
µ ≥ µ := max
s
{
2− ln ps
pis
}
(C.1)
Second, for any problem, there is an upper bound placed on µ by the requirement that the
pˆis′ < 1 in the solution to the first-order condition for the probability that is positively-biased
state. Thus, for state s′ to have pˆis′ > pis′ , we require
µ < µ¯ (s′) := 1 + pis′ − ln ps′ .
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Consider first m. As one decreases ps′ , µ increases (at least once ps′/pis′ is the minimum),
µ¯ (s′) increases, and µ¯ (s) for s 6= s′ does not change. Thus, there is an ms′ such that for
ps′ = ms′pis′ , µ¯ (s
′) > µ and µ¯ (s′) < µ for all s 6= s′. Thus, the agent must be optimistic
about state s′. Then m = mins′ {ms′}.
In terms of m¯, as one increases ps′ , there is an m¯ such that for ps′ = m¯pis, µ¯ (s
′) < µ
and µ¯ (s′) > µ for some s 6= s′. Thus, the agent must be pessimistic about state s′. Then m¯
= maxs′ {m¯s′}.¥
D. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof by construction in the text.
E. Proof of Proposition 5
This Proposition is not trivial because, while an increase in the price of a given state decreases
the demand for the asset that pays off in that state, an increase in the price of a state for
which pˆi∗s < pis decreases the demands for the assets that pay off in all other states that are
viewed with pessimism. Following the proof of Proposition 5, we prove two Lemmata that
characterize these price effects in Section F.
We start with the following Lemma.
Lemma 6: In any equilibrium with actuarially fair prices:
S∑
s=1
(
pˆi2s
pˆis − pis
)
> 0. (E.1)
or equivalently
pis′
(
c¯2
c¯− 1
)
+
∑
s 6=s′
pis
(
c2
c− 1
)
> 0 (E.2)
Proof: By Lemma 4, there are two consumption levels such that pˆis/pis = c and pˆis′/pis′ = c¯
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for all s 6= s′. Since subjective probabilities sum to one, ∑s6=s′ pˆis = 1− pˆis′ , and the budget
constraint at fair prices implies
1 = c¯pis′ +
∑
s6=s′
cpis
c =
1− pis′ c¯
1− pis′
c =
1− pˆis′
1− pis′ .
Using these relationships, our term of interest becomes:
S∑
s=1
pˆi2s
pˆis − pis =
pˆis′
1− pis′
pˆis′
+
∑
s 6=s′
pˆis
(
1
1− c−1
)
=
pˆi2s′
pˆis′ − pis′ + (1− pˆis
′)
1
1− 1−pis′
1−pˆis′
=
pˆi2s′
pˆis′ − pis′ +
(1− pˆis′)2
1− pˆis′ − 1 + pis′
=
2pˆis′ − 1
(pˆis′ − pis′)
which is positive if pˆis′ > 1/2. This follows from from Lemma 5.¥
For notational simplicity, let a index the states s ≤ s so that pis = pia and Cs = Ca for
for s ≤ s, and let b index the S− s states with pis = pib and Cs = Cb. Let a′ be the state, less
than or equal to s, that is viewed as more likely than it is; this state differs across investors
but all a-states are symmetric so we can impose that pa′ = pa.
To prove Proposition 5, we write the conditions for the initial equilibrium with fair prices,
totally differentiate the system for a small increase in the aggregate endowment in the a-
states, dCa, imposing that dpb = 0, show that dpa > 0, and check that dCb < 0. Because
there is a discrete interval between pia and pib and because the wellbeing functions evaluated
for different choices of s′(the state such that pˆis > pis) are continuous in prices, small enough
changes in pa and pb do not change the relative rankings of the wellbeing as a function of s
′.
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Thus, locally the pattern of a′ across investors remains unchanged.
E1. Equilibrium conditions at fair prices
The exogenous variables are S, s, pia. Given these three, pib is given by the fact that
probabilities sum to one
spia + (S − s) pib = 1.
For actuarially fair prices that (normalized) sum to one, we have
pa = pia
pb = pib.
Optimal beliefs are given by the investor first-order conditions,
pia′
pˆia′
− ln pia′
pˆia′
= µ− 1 + ln pa
pia
(E.3)
pia
pˆia
− ln pia
pˆia
= µ− 1 + ln pa
pia
for a 6= a′
pib
pˆib
− ln pib
pˆib
= µ− 1 + ln pb
pib
(note that at fair prices, the last two imply and pia
pˆia
= pib
pˆib
), and the fact that subjective
probabilities sum to one,
pˆia′ + (s− 1) pˆia + (S − s) pˆib = 1. (E.4)
These equations can be used to solve for pˆia′ , pˆia, pˆib and µ, which we know exist and are
unique. Note that c = pˆia
pia
= pˆib
pib
and c¯ =
pˆia′
pia′
.
Finally, the two remaining exogenous variables that deliver fair prices in equilibrium, Ca
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and Cb, are calculated from market clearing conditions:
Ca =
1
s
pˆia′
pa
+
(
1− 1
s
)
pˆia
pa
(E.5)
Cb =
pˆib
pb
.
We have three exogenous variables that are chosen to generate an initial fair-prices equi-
librium, pib, Ca, and Cb, six endogenous variables (µ, pˆia′ , pˆib, pˆia, pa, pb), and nine equations.
E2. Totally differentiated equilibrium conditions
We totally differentiate the system (E.3), (E.4), and (E.5) allowing Ca and Cb to vary and
imposing dpb = 0:
pˆia′ − pia′
pˆi2a′
dpˆia′ = dµ+
1
pa
dpa
pˆia − pia
pˆi2a
dpˆia = dµ+
1
pa
dpa for a 6= a′
pˆib − pib
pˆi2b
dpˆib = dµ+ 0 (E.6)
dpˆia′ + (s− 1) dpˆia + (S − s) dpˆib = 0
p2adCa =
1
s
(padpˆia′ − pˆia′dpa) +
(
1− 1
s
)
(padpˆia − pˆiadpa)
dCb =
dpˆib
pb
− 0 (E.7)
Now we want to study dpa, dCb, and dCb around an equilibrium with fair prices, i.e., with
pa
pia
= pb
pib
= 1.
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E3. Signing dpa, dCa and dCb around a fair price equilibrium
Set dCa = 1 (so that implicitly dx is dx/dCa), and re-write the equations using c¯ =
pˆia′
pia′
and
Cb =
pˆib
pb
and replace prices with probabilities:
c¯− 1
c¯2
1
pia
dpˆia′ = dµ+
1
pia
dpa
Cb − 1
C2b
1
pia
dpˆia = dµ+
1
pia
dpa for a 6= a′
Cb − 1
C2b
1
pib
dpˆib = dµ
dpˆia′ + (s− 1) dpˆia + (S − s) dpˆib = 0
1
s
(dpˆia′ − c¯dpa) +
(
1− 1
s
)
(dpˆia − Cbdpa) = pia
pbdCb = dpˆib
Now using the first three equations (the first-order conditions) to eliminate beliefs in the
third-to-last and the second-to-last equations gives:
(piaα + pibβ) dµ+ αdpa = 0 (E.8)
αpiadµ+
(
c¯
c¯− 1 + (s− 1)
Cb
Cb − 1
)
dpa = spia
where
α =
c¯2
c¯− 1 + (s− 1)
C2b
Cb − 1
β = (S − s) C
2
b
Cb − 1
Note that β < 0 since Cb− 1 = pˆib/pib− 1. In the current notation, the inequality of Lemma
6 is
pia
(
c¯2
c¯− 1
)
+ (s− 1) pib
(
c2
c− 1
)
+ (S − s)pib
(
c2
c− 1
)
= piaα + pibβ > 0
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Together these two inequalities imply that α > 0. Thus dµ and dpa have opposite signs.
Combining equations (E.8) gives
dpa =
spia
c¯
c¯−1 + (s− 1) CbCb−1 − α
2pia
piaα+pibβ
To show that dpa < 0, we note that the numerator is positive and that
c¯
c¯− 1 + (s− 1)
Cb
Cb − 1 = α− c¯− (s− 1)Cb
so that the sign of the denominator is given by the sign of:
(
c¯
c¯− 1 + (s− 1)
Cb
Cb − 1
)
(piaα+ pibβ)− α2pia
= (α− c¯− (s− 1)Cb) (piaα+ pibβ)− α2pia
= −c¯ (piaα+ pibβ)− (s− 1)Cb (piaα+ pibβ) + pibβα < 0
From equation (E.8), we have that dµ > 0, and from equations (E.6), we have that
dpˆib < 0, and so from equation (E.7), we have dCb < 0.
Thus, reversing signs, for a small reduction in aggregate risk – a decrease in Ca and an
increase in Cb – such that the expected returns on the less-skewed assets do not change,
dpb = 0, the expected returns on the more skewed assets rises, dpa < 0.¥
F. Lemmata on the effects of prices on demands
Lemma 7: (Law of demand for fair prices) For pis/ps = 1 for all s, c
∗
s (pˆi
∗ (p) ,p) =
c∗s (pˆi
∗
s (p) , ps) is decreasing in ps.
Proof of Lemma 7 : Let t be the (only) state for which price increases. If pˆi > pi and
switches to pˆi < pi, then we have our result. Otherwise, using Equation (2), the change in
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portfolio for a small change in pt is
dct
dpt
=
1
pt
dpˆit
dpt
− pˆit
(pt)
2 . (F.1)
We thus want to show that
dpˆit
dpt
<
pˆit
pt
.
Totally differentiating each first-order condition (Equations (4)), gives
dpˆit
dpt
=
(
pˆi2t
pˆit − pit
)(
dµ
dpt
+
1
pt
)
(F.2)
dpˆis
dpt
=
(
pˆi2s
pˆis − pis
)
dµ
dpt
for all s 6= t. (F.3)
Summing across all states and imposing that
∑S
s=1 dpis/dpt = 0 gives
dµ
dpt
= −
(
pˆi2t
pˆit−pit
)
∑S
s=1
(
pˆi2s
pˆis−pis
) 1
pt
which can be plugged into equation (F.2) to give
dpˆit
dpt
=
pˆit
pt
(
pˆit
pˆit − pit
)1−
(
pˆi2t
pˆit−pit
)
∑S
s=1
(
pˆi2s
pˆis−pis
)
 .
Thus, we have our result iff
1 >
(
pˆit
pˆit − pit
)∑s6=t
(
pˆi2s
pˆis−pis
)
∑S
s=1
(
pˆi2s
pˆis−pis
)
 .
If pˆit > pit, then
∑
s 6=t
(
pˆi2s
pˆis−pis
)
< 0, and our result follows if
S∑
s=1
(
pˆis
1− pis
pˆis
)
> 0
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which is true by Lemma 6.
If pˆit < pit, then our result also follows if this inequality is satisfied because that implies∑
s6=t
(
pˆi2s
pˆis−pis
)
> 0.¥
Lemma 8: (Cross-price effects for fair prices) For pis/ps = 1 for all s and t such that
t 6= s , c∗s (pˆi∗s (p) , ps) is increasing in pt if pˆi∗s > pis or pˆi∗t > pit, otherwise it is decreasing in pt
as long as it remains true that pˆi∗s < pis.
Proof of Lemma 8: If the investor switches to become optimistic about state s as we
increase the price of the state previously viewed with optimism, then we have our result.
Increasing the price of another state cannot cause the investor to switch their optimism from
the state viewed with optimism.
So under the assumption that the investor remains optimistic about the same state, using
Equation (2), for any s 6= t, the change in portfolio for a small change in pt is
dcs
dpt
=
1
ps
dpˆis
dpt
.
We thus the sign of dcs
dpt
is the same as that of dpˆis
dpt
> 0.
Totally differentiating each first-order condition (equations (4)), gives
dpˆit
dpt
=
(
pˆi2t
pˆit − pit
)(
dµ
dpt
+
1
pt
)
dpˆis
dpt
=
(
pˆi2s
pˆis − pis
)
dµ
dpt
for all s 6= t. (F.4)
Summing across all states and imposing that
∑S
s=1 dpis/dpt = 0 gives
dµ
dpt
= −
(
pˆi2t
pˆit−pit
)
∑S
s=1
(
pˆi2s
pˆis−pis
) 1
pt
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which can be plugged into equation (F.4) to give
dpˆis
dpt
= −
(
pˆi2s
pˆis−pis
)(
pˆi2t
pˆit−pit
)
∑S
s=1
(
pˆi2s
pˆis−pis
) 1
pt
.
From Lemma 6, we have that
∑S
s=1
(
pˆi2s
pˆis−pis
)
> 0, thus dpˆis
dpt
> 0 if pˆis > pis or pˆit > pit otherwise
it is negative.¥
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